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Abstract: The  Van  Rompuy  Report  and  also  additional  proposals  made  by  the  European
Commission outlined steps for a 'genuine Economic and Monetary Union'. This article explains,
assesses  and  comments  on  the  proposals  made.  Moreover,  it  outlines  what  could  be
recommendations  in  order  to  achieve  a  'genuine  Economic  and  Monetary  Union'.  For  this
purpose, details of the Interim Report are systematically evaluated. We also deal with different
governance visions emerging from the ongoing euro area crisis and starts from different views
of the 'North and the South' of the euro area on this issue. This contribution argues that there
is an alternative option to the notion of cooperative fiscal  federalism involving fiscal  union,
bailouts and debt mutualisation: competition-based fiscal federalism accompanied by a properly
defined banking union. In order to be a successful one, any deal will have to come up with a
successful  recipe  of  how to  (re-)create  trust  between  European  citizens  and  their  elected
governments.
Keywords: banking  union;  debt  mutualisation;  EU  governance;  Euro  budget;  Eurozone;
genuine Economic and Monetary Union; North–South divide; shock absorber
1. Introduction
The June 2012 European Council invited the President
of the European Council together with the Presidents
of  the  Eurogroup,  the  ECB  and  the  European
Commission  to  develop  "a  specific  and  time-bound
road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic
and Monetary Union"  [1].  The European Parliament
launched  an own-initiative  procedure  on this  report
[2]. On this basis, the European Commission delivered
its ahead of mid-December EU Summit paper on 28
November 2012 [3].
The Interim Report was presented on 12 October
2012  [4]  and  the  final  report  was  published  on  5
December 2012. The Interim Report, concentrating on
the  euro  area  Member  States,  lays  down  several
proposals for the implementation of a real Economic
and Monetary Union. This work programme is to be
analysed  in  this  paper  and  considers  four  main
Building Blocks:
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1. Integrated  financial  framework (single
European  banking  supervision,  common  deposit
insurance and resolution framework);
2. Integrated budgetary framework (stronger
economic  governance,  fiscal  capacity  and  a  safe
and liquid financial asset for the euro area);
3. Integrated  economic  policy  framework
(reforms  of  the  EU  surveillance  framework,
promoting structural reforms through arrangements
of a contractual nature, and strengthening macro-
prudential policy); and
4. Ensuring  democratic  legitimacy  and
accountability of decision making.
1.1. Building Block 1—Integrated Financial Framework
This Building Block essentially refers to the fragmenta-
tion of Eurozone financial markets, which has already
been  identified  by  ECB  President  Mario  Draghi,  on
several  occasions,  as  the  most  significant  problem,
due to its credit tightening effects. Hence, there is the
necessity for an integrated financial framework which
should consist (i) of a single supervisory authority, (ii)
of a common resolution framework implemented by a
common resolution authority, and (iii) of national de-
posit guarantee schemes erected on common stand-
ards.  According  to  the  Interim  Report,  all  Building
Blocks  are  logically  intertwined.  For  instance,  any
method of sharing banking sector risks (Building Block
1)  must  rely  on  effective  fiscal  discipline  (Building
Block 2) if moral hazard of sovereigns is to be avoided.
Notably, the establishment of  a single supervisory
mechanism  (SSM) has been labelled a  priority goal.
Moreover, the single supervisory mechanism should be
hosted  by the ECB,  following a proposal  by the EU
Commission, and clearly separate the ECB's monetary
policy from supervisory duties. It has to balance rights
and  obligations  for  all  participating  Member  States.
Finally,  the  SSM  has  to  operate  consistently  with
Single Market principles and is to be held accountable
to the European public, i.e. the European Parliament.
Since the deliberations of the Interim Report concen-
trate on the euro area Member States, it does not say
anything about an extension to non-euro EU Member
States, notably the UK.
Concerning  resolution,  the Interim Report  heavily
draws upon the EU Commission's Recovery and Resol-
ution Directive. The resolution authority is intended to
move from the national to the common level as soon
as the SSM is set in place. Transitorily, banks have the
possibility  to be recapitalised directly  by the ESM if
they comply with 'appropriate conditionality'.
Finally,  the  Interim  Report  does  not  explicitly
mention,  but  seems  to  suggest  a  common  deposit
insurance mechanism to ensure a level playing field.
Again  the  Report  is  silent  about  the  integration  of
non-euro EU members. At least it supports the view
that  even  harmonising  national  guarantee  schemes
according to legislative proposal have a pre-emptive
role  in  stabilising  the  financial  system.  As  a  basic
principle,  they  should  be  funded  by  the  financial
sector itself to a sufficient extent.
1.2. Building Block 2—Integrated Budgetary 
Framework
The starting point for this section is the high degree
of  interdependence  among  Member  States.  For
instance,  the  recent  crisis  has  again  dramatically
shown  that  national  budget  policies  can  have  euro
area-wide (and beyond) spillovers. As a consequence,
the  Interim  Report  calls  for  complementing  the
current  budget  surveillance and coordination  frame-
work with a more  ex ante focused scheme,  for  in-
stance  the  'Two-pack'.  In  the  same  vein,  the  euro
area  is  to  end  up  in  a  'fully-fledged  integrated
budgetary framework'. The latter is hoped to "ensure
sound budgetary policies at both the national and the
European  levels  and,  thus,  sustainable  growth  and
macroeconomic  stability".  Interestingly,  the  report
sees  EMU  endowed  with  'unique  features',  which
necessitates a specific approach to the centralisation
of budgetary instruments and fiscal insurance mech-
anisms ([4],  p. 4).  In passing, it  introduces a clear
macro policy assignment: whereas monetary policy is
responsible for  coping with symmetric shocks,  fiscal
policy is responsible for asymmetric shocks which are
understood as country-specific but not region-specific.
In terms of a  stronger economic governance, the
ex  ante  coordination  of  Member  States'  annual
budgets and their surveillance under financial distress
have—according  to  the  Interim  Report—to  be
strengthened.  In the short run, the main focus is on
finalising and implementing the 'Two-pack' to strengthen
fiscal governance in the euro area, starting from the 'Six-
pack'  and  the  Treaty  on  Stability,  Coordination  and
Governance, which are already in force.
By gradually developing what will be decided at the
December European Council no more closely specified
than new fiscal capacity with new fiscal functions for
the EMU, the authors intend to deliver an additional
valve  to  relieve  asymmetric  shocks,  i.e.  shocks  to
specific Member States. As a first explanation, the In-
terim  Report  refers  to  "low  levels  of  cross-country
labour  mobility  and  structural  impediments  to  price
flexibility (which) make economic adjustment mechan-
isms less effective than in other monetary unions" as
a 'unique feature' of the EMU. A second rationale is to
facilitate  structural  reforms  which  are  beneficial  for
competitiveness and growth—surely a concession to
the 'Northern', in particular the German, governments.
More precisely: the report proposes funding the pro-
motion of structural reforms through arrangements of
contractual  nature  within  the  'integrated  economic
policy framework' (i.e. Building Block 3). Put simply,
even  the  possibility  of  the  new  fiscal  capacity  to
borrow and, hence, a full-fledged treasury function is
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suggested—a  clear  concession  to  the  'South',  but
seemingly as no more than a vision for the future.
As a sub-block of Building Block 2, but again rather
defensively, the Interim Report addresses a safe and
liquid  financial  asset  for  the  euro  area  in  order  to
break the vicious circle among the fate of the banks
and the fate of the Member States—again a conces-
sion to the 'South'.  A redemption fund and eurobills
(short-term maturities)  are  mentioned  as  measures
for the medium term—but, for instance, the 50 page
blueprint  on  future  EMU released  by  the  European
Commission  [3]  acknowledges  that  both  require  a
treaty change. Full eurobonds are for the long term.
Collateral could be required for the redemption fund,
but  no  details  are  given  with  respect  to  types  of
collateral (gold, etc.).
1.3. Building Block 3—Integrated Economic Policy 
Framework
Under this heading the Interim Report comes up with
the  need  to  revitalise  the  reforms  of  the  EU
surveillance framework, promoting structural reforms
through  arrangements  of  a  contractual  nature,  and
strengthening macro-prudential policy. While the first
two serve to improve the global  competitiveness of
Europe and the internal competitiveness of euro area
Member  States,  the  latter  enhances  the  ability  to
prevent asset and credit bubbles.
The  newly  implemented  surveillance  measures
should  be  made  more  visible,  authoritative  and  be
endowed with more  impact.  At  the same time,  the
single  market  should  be  completed.  What  is  more,
structural  reforms  should  be  promoted  through
arrangements of a contractual nature such as limited,
temporary,  flexible  and  targeted  financial  incentives
for  reform  steps  previously  identified  within  sub-
component 1—the surveillance framework. Finally, the
Interim  Report  proposes  strengthening  macro-
prudential policies—optimally through making macro-
prudential policy tools available to the single super-
visor, the ECB, and granting the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB) a larger role in this process.
1.4. Building Block 4—Ensuring Democratic 
Legitimacy and accountability
The fourth and last Building Block refers to the issues
of  democratic  legitimacy  and  accountability  of  the
proposed  euro  area/EU  governance  structures.  The
Interim  Report  also  admits  that  it  has  to  carefully
weigh up the roles of the European Parliament versus
the  national  parliaments.  Its  guiding  principle  is
"democratic control and accountability should occur at
the level at which the decisions are taken" ([4], p. 8).
However, this does not exclude benefits from closer
cooperation  of  the  European  Parliament  with  the
national parliaments.
In the following, this paper assesses and comments
the  proposals  made  and  outlines  potential
recommendations  in  order  to  achieve  a  'genuine
Economic  and Monetary Union'  also considering the
'four Building Blocks'. For this purpose, it distinguishes
—where possible—between short-term, medium-term
and long-term measures. In Section 2, details of the
Interim  Report  are  systematically  evaluated  with
scrutiny. Section 3 concludes.
2. Is Europe's Search for a Genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union Misguided?
The main merit of the Interim Report is that it truly
hits the core of the political debate on the future of
the euro. The time has come to talk more frankly than
before about questions such as whether a single cur-
rency really requires a significant pooling of national
policies and which players in the euro area are really
willing to follow this logic [5,6]. A first taste of these
kinds  of  discussions  was  conveyed  by  Wolgang
Schäuble's now-famous call for an EU Monetary Affairs
Commissioner equipped with rights to punch-through
on  national  budgetary  policies,  comparable  to  his
colleague from DG Competition (see [7]).
2.1. Member States and Participating Institutions Try 
to Impose Their Own Interests
This note does not necessarily intend to go as far as,
for  instance,  Mussler  [8],  who  argues  that  such  a
fundamental debate in the euro area does not seem
to be really desired, although the leaders in June 2012
asked a group of four, namely the Presidents of the
European Council, the EU Commission, the European
Central Bank and the Eurogroup to outline the way to
a  'genuine'  monetary  union  [9].  But  the  Interim
Report, as outlined above, and also the current long-
enduring controversial discussion about the details of
the  banking  union  (Building  Block  1)  make  it  very
clear that a true political consensus on the direction is
still lacking. Along a clear 'North-South' divide visible
in the Interim Report, the respective governments are
still  trying  to  enforce  predominantly  their  own
interests  which  are  well-known  from  the  debates
about  the  'correct'  way  to  manage  the  euro  crisis.
Hence, the Report adopts the shape of a two-handed
approach or, as some might express it more bluntly,
as a not too coherent convenience store.
Moreover, it seems as if all four presidents involved
in the Interim Report have also been successful, to a
certain extent, in  enforcing their own and independ-
ent interests  in settling additional political competen-
cies  in  their  institutions.  In  a  wide  array  of  areas,
market governance is  in the Interim Report,  substi-
tuted  by  a  governance  by  institutions  which  are
shifted upwards to the EU-level and are well-known to
have their own life and vested interests [9]. What is
more, interest groups, such as banks and real estate
brokers,  are  then  able  to  delocalise  from the  local
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voters, who are their main competitors in impacting
government policies [10]. This substitution might be
seen either as a reflex consistent with the genesis of
the financial crisis or as a consequence of the attitude
of politicians to shift additional competencies at the
EU level [11]. But, from this political constellation, a
sensible governance solution can hardly emerge. The
reason is that the proposed governance structure and
its four Building Blocks (which are not even compat-
ible with each other in all  cases) are not incentive-
compatible  for  all  actors  from  a  politico-economic
point of view.
2.2. The Congenital Defects of the EMU Cannot 
Simply Be Defined Away Politically
What is more, the congenital defects of the monetary
union  cannot simply be defined away politically by a
resolution. The euro area is still far from forming an
optimal currency area, as has also been suggested by
the  Interim  Report  ([4],  pp.  4–5).  It  explicitly  ad-
dresses the basic fact that the textbook-style adjust-
ment  mechanisms to  external  demand shocks  work
much  worse  than  in  other  currency  areas.  Cross-
border labour mobility is  low, both national  product
markets  and  factor  markets  are  not  sufficiently
flexible: "Low levels of cross-country labour mobility
and  structural  impediments  to  price  flexibility  make
economic adjustment mechanisms less effective than
in other monetary unions" ([4], p. 5). But this precise
pattern is given as the 'EMU's unique feature' in the
Interim  Report  which  justifies  a  'specific  approach',
i.e. implementing a common budget as an asymmetric
shock absorber ([4], p. 4).
Does this not mean that the report considers the
rigidities as given, and thus gives in much too early by
still sticking to fiscal transfers to distressed countries?
This  would  be  a  dangerous  position,  since,  at  the
same time, parallel adjustment programmes are work-
ing quite successfully in the Southern Member States,
and especially dangerous in the programme countries.
Fiscal accommodation might even feedback negatively
to reform activity [12].
2.3. Independent National Fiscal Policies Are Generally 
Preferable to a Common Budget Because They Allow 
Risk Diversification
The Interim Report leaves the use of the 'Euro budget'
as open as other obvious questions, for instance, the
ratio of the 'Euro budget' in relation to the general EU
budget, from which it would be financed and the 'Euro
budget's scope [8].
"Asymmetric shock absorption at the central level
would  represent  a  form  of  limited  fiscal  solidarity
exercised  over  economic  cycles,  improving  the  eco-
nomic resilience of the EMU" ([4], p. 5). This is not a
specific conclusion of the Interim Report. Instead, it is
widely  assumed  that  a  common  currency  makes  it
desirable  also  to  have  a  common  fiscal  policy.
However, if fiscal policy is a  source of shocks, inde-
pendent national fiscal policies are said to be gener-
ally preferable because they allow risk diversification.
"The variance of  a  sum of shocks is  the lower the
lower the covariance among the individual  compon-
ents". Otherwise, we have a leadership problem: one
weak or bad leader in the euro area can suffice to
hole the euro project below the waterline [13]. This is
especially so in our context because fiscal transfers to
(a  lot  of)  financially  distressed  countries  would  be
highly correlated, which would then lead to a higher
variance of GDP in the euro area.
Also,  a reference to the US case may help.  Gros
[14] finds that the US federal budget comes up with
much less insurance against state specific shocks than
generally presumed, as the US Banking Union acts as
a strong shock absorber. From this angle, the long-
term stability of the EMU depends significantly more
on the completion of  plans for a European banking
union than on the instalment of a 'fiscal capacity' for
the euro area. In addition, the US budget is not an
instructive  example  in  the  context  of  the  Eurozone
budget since it redistributes significantly between US
regions at an amount of 30 to 40 percent of income
differences, but does not compensate for more than
10 to 15 percent  of  GDP shocks to specific  federal
states [14]. Finally, using the US unemployment insur-
ance system as a blueprint for a European one using
the European budget would be misleading since the
US  system  is  mainly  active  in  nationwide  business
cycle troughs, and unemployment benefits are simply
not large enough (2 to 3 percent of GDP) to cope with
GDP shocks of 10 percent and more, as seen during
the euro crisis [14]. Cases such as Spain, with (struc-
tural)  unemployment  rates  approaching  30  percent,
reveal  that  a  European  unemployment  insurance
scheme  would  clearly  risk  perpetuating  long-term
unemployment in such member countries ([5], hyster-
esis).
Hence, the more fundamental question to ask is:
how useful is the outlined transfer union? And how to
persuade  the  'North'  of  the  sense  of  a  severe
sovereignty  loss,  which  is  necessary  to  ensure  an
ever-inflating  'euro  rescue'  and,  more  importantly,
what necessary financial expenses are involved [8].
2.4. The 'South' Sees a 'Euro Budget' as an 
Instrument of Redistribution
Theoretically,  there  are  two possibilities  beyond the
unrealistic readmission of floating exchange rates to
improve  the  euro  area's  capacity  of  adjustment  to
external shocks. The first amounts to an increase of
labour  mobility  or  economic  reforms  to  strengthen
competitiveness. The second option is well-known to
be politically more convenient and attractive to euro
area  politicians:  the  shocks  can  be  mitigated  by
financial  transfers  to  hard-hit  countries.  The  four
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presidents of the mooted 'fiscal capacity' for the euro
area, i.e. the 'Euro budget', could be instrumental in
both options (Building Block 2). The German govern-
ment wants to see it mainly used as an incentive tool
to implement painful reforms in individual countries.
France, however, interprets it as a general European
instrument  of  redistribution  beyond  the  permanent
crisis fund ESM.
Given this background let us now again ask how
useful  the  outlined  transfer  union  is.  The  German
government, for example, maintains that these trans-
fers are not necessary because the economic reforms
in several euro countries are well advanced. However,
this is at best a half truth. That the current reduction
of  the  economic  divergence  means  that  they  have
melted away permanently may well be doubted [15].
And  the  new  instruments  with  which  the  EU  is  to
bring  national  economic  policies  back  on  the  right
path show little effect. This is not only due to the lack
of enforcement of sanctions. This is also because a
fine-tuning of various parameters of  economic policy
by pan-European actors and institutions is simply not
possible [8].
Hence, we must fear that the euro area is further
from a  'genuine'  monetary  union than ever  before,
and that is quite logical. The question now, is rather,
how many compromises will  the  currency  union be
able to stand in its current form?
2.5. On the Necessity of a European Supervisory 
Authority
In Building Block 1 and also throughout the text, the
Interim Report  argues in favour  of  a  supra-national
European supervisory authority. The usual  argument
is  that  national  supervision  of  banks  leads  to
'regulatory capture' (which is not necessarily weaker
at the EU level,  [10]),  and thus to a vicious circle.
However, this could also be prevented by limiting the
share of domestic government debt in the domestic
banks'  portfolios  (i.e.  the  Weidmann-proposal)  (see
[16]). Needless to say, the financial distress of most
southern  euro  area  governments  cannot  be  traced
back to any necessity to support their banks. What is
more,  a  large extent  of  the knowledge relevant  for
supervisors is of local nature, and the internal effects
of the financial crisis were significantly more devastat-
ing than the external impacts. Thus, national super-
visors had a larger  interest  in  adequate  supervision
than foreign authorities.
Finally, the Interim Report favours a 'level playing
field' ([4], pp. 2–3). However, generally speaking, this
is  not  at  all  optimal  from an economic  perspective.
There  are  important  reasons  not  to  enforce  equal
conditions on these markets: national authorities are
sometimes better informed, national banking systems
have  different  profiles  and  needs.  Finally,  yardstick
competition in regulation is well-known to foster in-
novation and contributes to diversification of regulat-
ory risk, i.e. risks of regulatory error [17].
The  Interim  Report  diametrically  contradicts  the
recommendations  of  the  De  Larosière  Report  on
Financial  Supervision  in  the European Union:  'While
the Group supports an extended role for the ECB in
macro-prudential  oversight,  it  does not  support  any
role for  the ECB for micro-prudential  supervision',  a
report  which  has  been requested  by  the  'EU'  itself
(see [18]).
2.6. The Interim Report: Further Points of Discussion
The  Interim  Report  claims  that  monetary  policy  is
overall  responsible  for  common  shocks  ([4],  p.  5).
This might be true in the long run, but in the mean-
time  we  are  stuck  in  a  clear  re-nationalisation  of
monetary policies in  the euro area (see the debate
organised by The Economist on the pros and cons of
debt mutualisation as an element of future Eurozone
governance among Belke, and de Grauwe [19]). The
exit  from  these  unconventional  policies  is  probably
more  demanding  than  envisaged  by  the  report,  as
argued earlier.  What is  more,  the Interim Report  is
contradictory in itself by stating that '(in) the EMU, the
response to a symmetric shock affecting all countries
simultaneously  should  primarily  be  provided  by
monetary policy' ([4], p. 5) but at the same time it is
well-known  that  the  credit  crunch  has  been  very
selective,  i.e.  'South'  bound  and  precisely  for  this
reason, monetary policy has become re-nationalised.
This  immediately  implies  that  the  current  monetary
policy assignment, having monetary policy supporting
structurally distressed countries for years [20], stands
in  sharp  contrast  to  the  recommendations  of  the
Interim Report itself.
"One of the functions of such a new fiscal capacity
could be to facilitate adjustments to country-specific
shocks by providing for some degree of absorption at
the  central  level"  ([4],  p.  5).  This  suggests  that
country-specific  multipliers  are of  a reasonable  size.
The European Commission shows in its recent Autumn
Forecast  that  the  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook
statement  that  the  fiscal  multiplier  is  much  higher
than assumed up to now is not tenable as soon as
one  implements  further  control  variables  in  the
estimated equation [21,22]. It is well-known that the
ECB fiscal  experts also come up with very different
estimation  results  from  the  IMF.  Unfortunately,  a
policy of austerity is accompanied by hardship, but it
is, by definition, not possible to grow out of a current
account deficit. And, especially with respect to Spain,
the  Commission  has  already  demonstrated  huge
flexibility in its magnitude and speed of fiscal adjust-
ment.  This  much  is  clear:  Without  the  EU-IMF
programme (and the overly generous support by the
ECB's monetary policy) fiscal adjustment would have
had  to  happen  much  more  quickly—due  to  the
balance of payment restriction which is currently felt,
for instance, by France.
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'Overall,  the  creation  of  an  integrated  financial
framework  (…) cannot be envisaged separately from
steps  towards  more  integrated  fiscal  and  economic
frameworks' ([4], p. 3). It is probably not correct to
state  that  an  integrated  financial  framework  is  not
possible  without  more  integrated  fiscal  frameworks.
Here,  the  answer  is  to  implement  a  kind  of  fiscal
federalism as a form of EU governance structure [5].
'(A)  fully-fledged integrated  budgetary  framework
(…) will  ensure  sound  budgetary  policies  at  the
national and European levels and thereby contribute
to  sustainable  growth  and  macroeconomic  stability'
([4],  p.  4). Why and to what extent should a fully-
fledged  integrated  budgetary  framework  necessarily
ensure more sound budgetary policies at the national
and the EU level, leading to growth, than it does in
the status quo? A related point is the following: 'an-
other  important  function  of  such  a  fiscal  capacity
would be to facilitate structural reforms' ([4], p. 5). Of
course, the answer of the Interim Report is: positive
incentives.  But  who  guarantees  that  the  rules  of
public choice and political  economy do not apply in
this  setting?  Why  are  the  players  on  the  EU-level
which run all the new institutions proposed by the re-
port more benevolent than the national ones, etc. [9]?
"(I)n  the  context  of  country-specific  economic
shocks,  the  response  falls  primarily  on  national
budgets" ([4], p. 5). But the Interim Report does not
take into account that asymmetric shocks emerging in
a currency union should not and cannot be automatic-
ally absorbed by national budgets. Shocks are often
regional but not necessarily national in nature. Exactly
for this reason we advised  against national stability
funds when  asked  by  the  European  Parliament  in
1998  [22,23].  Hence,  regionally  flexible  goods  and
factor markets are necessary ingredients.
'A well-functioning shock absorption function would
require a further degree of convergence between eco-
nomic structures and policies of the Member States'
([4], p. 5). Is this not an internal contradiction since
the Interim Report argues that a new central  shock
absorber is needed  because  reforms are lacking and
the degree of reform significantly differs among Mem-
ber Countries? Expressed differently, I do not see any
envisaged stop of the new centralised shock-absorber
as soon as the necessary degree of reforms is reached
by using this new fiscal capacity.
'(T)he pooling of some short-term sovereign fund-
ing instruments (e.g. treasury bills) on a limited and
conditional basis could be examined further' ([4], p.
6).  It  can  be  argued  in  different  contexts  such  as
Eurobonds and/or OMTs that confidence in the condi-
tionality  of  even  temporary  'pooling'  might  be  mis-
guided  [20,24].  Moreover,  it  potentially  contradicts
principles of democracy because it necessitates adher-
ing to rules with which national parliaments are not
necessarily compliant (Building Block 4).
"(A)n  integrated economic  policy  framework con-
tributes to avoiding the large and rapid buildup of im-
balances" ([4], pp. 6–7). The ability to handle asset
and credit bubbles through the proposed measures is
not guaranteed with an eye on the commitment to a
very accommodative monetary policy; this drawback
is  not  necessarily  compensated  by  more  prudential
policy tools (Building Block 3).
This is only a very selective choice of questions and
caveats.  There  are  certainly  more  of  them,  for  in-
stance, whether 'completing the single market' in the
Interim Report means tax coordination instead of tax
competition in view of the alleged Irish 'tax dumping'
activities; or whether the integrated economic policy
framework and the implied coordination mechanisms
are explicitly said to be open to Member States that
have not introduced the euro right now ([4],  p. 7).
Should this also be valid with respect to Building Block
1, i.e., the components of a banking union? Even so,
the  UK  and  some  non-euro  Scandinavian  countries
had  some  incentive  to  financially  support  Ireland
during the crisis.
Starting  from the working assumption of  the  In-
terim Report ([4], p. 8) that "(t)he governance frame-
work  would  also  benefit  from  an  active  and  open
social dialogue", it appears overall worthwhile to have
a  detailed  look  at  differences  in  the  visions  of  EU
governance  between  the  'North'  and  the  'South'  of
Member States [19].
3. Different Governance Visions Emerging from 
the Ongoing Eurozone Crisis—The "North" and 
the "South"
3.1. Introductory Remarks
The European summit that ended on 29 June 2012,
declared that it was "imperative to break the vicious
circle  between  banks  and  sovereigns".  Markets
revived  on  the  hope  that  the  leaders  were  finally
ready to act to deal with the threat to the euro, and
then  soon  lost  heart  amid  the  cacophony  of  rival
interpretations about what had been agreed. Still, the
leaders had identified the right issue: weak banks and
weak sovereigns  are like two bad swimmers that are
pulling each other under water [25].
But which one should be saved first? Proponents of
the "Southern view" like, for instance, Paul De Grauwe
[19] tell us to start with the sovereigns, by throwing
them  the  lifejacket  of  joint-issued  debt.  In  effect,
richer countries would guarantee at least part of the
debt of weaker ones (Building Block 2).
Representatives  of  the  "Northern",  and  especially
the "German view", reckon instead that it is  better to
start by saving the banks (Building Block 1). This would
be done through stronger central supervision and the
mutualisation of some liabilities in the banking sector,
for  instance through a  joint  fund  to  wind up failing
banks and provide a Europe-wide guarantee of bank
deposits. In effect, depositors in solid banks would be
guaranteeing the savings of those in more fragile ones.
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Following the identification of different and oppos-
ing views contained in the Interim Report above, this
section  finds  it  adequate  to  build  upon  a  highly
stylised, but widespread, definition of the "Southern"
and  the  "Northern"  view.  The  former  usually  com-
prises countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
and, quite frequently, also France. The latter is often
used synonymously with the "German" view and also
includes  countries  like  Austria,  Finland  and  the
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, also France. Since
the  exact  characteristics  of  both  views  may  still
remain unclear, let us outline them in the remainder of
this section more deeply.
Both sides—the "North" and the "South" agree on
many things, such as the current threat to the survival
of the euro. They both recognise the danger that debt
mutualisation  could  bring  moral  hazard  and  higher
costs for creditor countries. For representatives of the
"Northern  view"  there  is  no  getting  around  these
problems. For the "South", though, these risks can be
removed, or at least mitigated, through careful design
of the system as expressed by the Interim Report. For
instance,  the  Eurozone  could  impose  conditions  on
countries  seeking  the  benefit  of  jointly  issued  debt
(Building Block 2).
The "South" sees the main threat to the Eurozone
as coming from the fear and panic that can suddenly
raise  borrowing  costs  and  push  countries  into
insolvency. The "North", on the contrary, reckons the
principal  menace  stems  from  removing  this  market
pressure too quickly, which lets it dampen the need to
reform.
Both speak of the political backlash that the crisis
creates.  For  the "South"  it  is  excessive  austerity  in
debtor nations that will be resisted; for the "North" it
is excessive liabilities in creditor states that can cause
resentment.
In some ways, though, they are not so far apart.
The  "North"  concedes  that  it  is  necessary  to  have
some  mutualisation  of  debt,  if  only  to  recapitalise
banks [5]. The "South" accepts that debt mutualisa-
tion must be limited to avoid moral hazard [19].
3.2. Opening–Contrasting the "Southern" and the 
"Northern" Views
In the following, the basic ingredients of the "South-
ern"  and  the  "Northern"  views  are  contrasted  with
each other.
3.2.1. The "Southern" View: Some Basics
The main argument of the "South" runs as follows.
Since  the  1970s,  economists  have  warned  that  a
budgetary union would be a necessity for a sustain-
able  monetary  union.  But  the  founders  of  the
Eurozone  had  no  ears  for  this  warning.  It  is  now
patently clear that they were mistaken and that the
governments of the euro area member countries face
the following hard choice today: either they fix this
design failure and move to a budgetary union; or they
do not fix it, which means that the euro will have to
be  abandoned.  Although  analysts  such  as  Paul  de
Grauwe  were  sceptics  about  the  desirability  of  a
monetary union during the 1990s (contrary to [26]),
the same author now takes the view that we cannot
properly  manage  a  deconstruction  of  the  Eurozone
[19]. A disintegration of the Eurozone would produce
huge  economic,  social  and  political  upheavals  in
Europe. If the euro area governments want to avoid
these, they have to look for strategies that move us
closer towards a budgetary union (Building Block 2).
A budgetary union, like that in the US, appears to
be so far off that there is no reasonable prospect of
achieving this in the Eurozone "during our lifetimes".
Does  that  imply  that  the  idea  of  establishing  a
budgetary union and thus a 'genuine Economic and
Monetary Union' is a pure chimera? De Grauwe [19]
argues that this drastic assessment is not at all valid
and that there is a strategy of taking small steps that
can guide us  in  the right  direction.  But  before  this
strategy can be outlined and compared to the Interim
Report,  it  is—according  to  the  "Southern"  view—
important  to  understand  one  of  the  main  design
failures  of  the  Eurozone.  This  will  deliver  some
information about what exactly has to be fixed.
The  "Southern"  argument  starts  from  the  basic
idea that Eurozone governments issue debt in euros
which is a currency they cannot control. As a result,
and  in  contrast  to  "stand-alone"  countries  like
Britain,  they  endow  bondholders  with  a  guarantee
that the cash to pay them out at maturity will always
be available [27].
The fact that governments of the Eurozone are not
able  to  deliver  such  a  guarantee  to  bondholders
makes  them vulnerable  to upsurges  of  distrust  and
fear in the bond markets. These can trigger liquidity
crises that, in a self-fulfilling way, can drive countries
towards  default,  forcing  them  to  apply  austerity
programmes  that  lead  to  deep  recessions  and
ultimately  also  to  banking crises [19].  According  to
the "Southern" view, this is not to say that countries
that have overspent in the past do not have to apply
austerity. They will have to. It is rather that financial
markets,  when  they  are  driven  by  panic,  force
austerity on these countries with an intensity that can
trigger  major  social  and  political  backlashes  that
policymakers may not be able to control. The effects
are there to see in a number of Southern European
countries [19].
Their previous diagnosis of a design failure of the
Eurozone leads proponents of the "Southern view" to
the idea that  some form of  pooling  of  government
debt  is  necessary to overcome this  failure  (Building
Block 2). By pooling government debt, the weakest in
the union are shielded from the destructive upsurges
of fear and panic that regularly arise in the financial
markets  of  a  monetary union and that  can hit  any
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country.  "Those  that  are strong today may become
weak tomorrow, and vice versa" [19].
Representatives  of  the  "South"  agree  that,  of
course, not just any type of pooling of national debts
is  acceptable.  They  acknowledge  that  the  major
concern of the strong countries that are asked to join
in such an arrangement is  moral hazard—that is, the
risk that those that profit from the creditworthiness of
the  strong  countries  exploit  this  and  lessen  their
efforts to reduce debts and deficits. This moral hazard
risk  is  the  main  obstacle  to  pooling  debt  in  the
Eurozone. The Interim Report is silent in this respect;
it does not refer to any form of pledges such as gold.
The second obstacle is that, inevitably, the strongest
countries will pay a higher interest rate on their debts
as  they  become  jointly  liable  for  the  debts  of
governments with lower creditworthiness. Thus, debt
pooling must be designed in such a way as to over-
come these obstacles.
Moderate  proponents  of  the  "Southern"  view,
apparently in agreement with the Merkel government,
agree that there are  three principles  that should be
followed in designing the right type of debt pooling
[19]. First, it should be  partial—that is, a significant
part of the debt must remain the responsibility of the
national governments so as to give them a continuing
incentive  to  reduce  debts  and  deficits.  Several
proposals  have  been made to  achieve  this  (among
them  [28]  and  [29]).  Second,  an  internal  transfer
mechanism  between the members of the pool must
ensure  that  the  less  creditworthy  countries  com-
pensate (at least partially) the more creditworthy ones
[19]. Third, a tight control mechanism on the progress
of national governments in achieving sustainable debt
levels must be an essential part of debt pooling. The
Padoa-Schioppa  group  has  recently  proposed  a
gradual loss of control over their national budgetary
process for the breakers of budgetary rules [30].
Proponents  of  the  "Southern"  view  acknowledge
that  the  Eurozone is  in  the  midst  of  an existential
crisis that  is  slowly  but  inexorably  destroying  its
foundations. They immediately conclude that the only
way to stop this is to convince the financial markets
that  the Eurozone is  here to stay [19].  Their  main
argument  is  that  debt  pooling  which  satisfies  the
principles outlined above would give a signal to the
markets  that  the  members  of  the  Eurozone  are
serious in their intention to stick together. Without this
signal the markets will—according to their argument—
not  calm  down  and  an  end  to  the  euro  will  be
inevitable [19]. In the words of Angela Merkel: these
policies are without alternative.
Materially,  the  "Northern"  view  described  below
represents the accumulation of a multitude of reac-
tions  of  the  "North"  to  these  much  more  activist
"Southern" proposals of several kinds of debt mutual-
isation,  which have frequently been pushed forward
since the start of the euro crisis.
3.2.2. The "Northern" View: Important Facets
One of the fundamental principles of the "Northern"
view is that the mutualisation of the Eurozone's debt
to bring about the convergence of interest rates as
proposed within Building Block 2 of the Interim Report
will  not,  in  the  long  run,  tackle  the  roots  of  the
problems.  Instead  it  has  the  potential  to  sow  the
seeds of an even larger crisis in the future [16,31].
They allude to what happened in the early years of
the euro when interest rates largely converged. Para-
doxically,  perhaps,  this paved the way for a greater
divergence of national fiscal policies. A reckless lack of
discipline in countries such as Greece and Portugal—
be they more (Greece) or less (Portugal) insolvent—
was matched by the build-up of asset bubbles in other
member countries such as Spain and Ireland, deemed
merely illiquid. Structural reforms were delayed, while
wages outstripped productivity growth. The represent-
atives  of  the  "Northern"  view  stress  that  the  con-
sequence was a huge loss of competitiveness in the
periphery, which will by definition not be resolved by
the  mutualisation  of  debt  as  proposed  in  Building
Block 2 of the interim report [5].
Debt mutualisation can take different forms. One is
to mutualise new sovereign debt through Eurobonds
([28], more than 7 variants). Another is to merge part
of the old debt, as advocated by the German Council
of  Economic  Advisors  [29]  with  its  proposal  for  a
partly  gold-backed  European  Redemption  Fund.  A
third means is to activate the Eurozone's "firewall" by
using  the  rescue  funds  (either  the  temporary
European Financial Stability Facility or the permanent
European  Stability  Mechanism)  to  buy  sovereign
bonds on the secondary (or even primary) market, or
to inject capital directly into distressed banks. Indeed,
the  ECB  is  already  engaged  in  a  hidden  form  of
mutualisation—of  risk  if  not  (yet)  of  actual  debt—
through its programmes of sovereign bond purchases
(the  Securities  Market  Programme,  SMP,  and  the
announced  conditional  Outright  Monetary  Transac-
tions, OMTs) and its long-term refinancing operations
for banks.
The view of the "North" is that almost all of these
are  bound  to  fail  either  for  economic  or  political
reasons, or both. The governments of even financially
strong countries cannot agree to open-ended commit-
ments that could endanger their own financial stability
or, given that they are the main guarantors, that of
the bailout funds. And the danger of moral hazard is
ever-present [5].
Proponents of the "Northern" view, point to the fact
that any form of mutualisation involves an element of
subsidy  (the Interim Report speaks of an element of
limited solidarity), which severely weakens fiscal dis-
cipline: the interest rate premium on bonds of fiscally
weaker  countries  declines  and  the  premium  for
stronger  countries  increases.  Fiscally  solid  countries
are  punished  and  less  solid  ones,  in  turn,  are
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rewarded for their lack of fiscal discipline and excess
private and public consumption.
If  yields  are  too  low,  there  is  no  incentive  for
private investors to buy sovereign bonds. The coun-
tries  risk  becoming  decoupled  from  the  capital
markets permanently, and the debt problems become
increasingly structural.
This  is  true  also  for  the  ECB's  bond-buying  an-
nouncements  and  activities.  The  credit  risk  is  thus
simply  rolled  over  from  the  bonds  of  the  weaker
countries to those of the stronger ones (depending on
the buyback price), and the ECB is made responsible
for its liability. Over time, the ECB's measures might
even be inflationary. Having the rescue funds to buy
bonds  is  little  different,  except  that  they  lack  the
landing capacity to be credible.  If  they are given a
banking  license,  as  demanded  by  the  "South"  (for
instance, by French President Hollande), it would be
no different from having the ECB buy bonds directly.
What about the European Redemption Fund (ERP)
from the "Northern"  perspective?  This  type of  fund
could be of particular help to Italy, which could unload
half of its debt. But its partners could not force Italy
to tax its citizens to ensure it pays back the dormant
debt.  And  with  the  assumption  of  debt,  the  credit
rating of Germany might drop due to the increase of
the  German  interest  burden.  The pressure  on Italy
and  Spain  to  consolidate  their  budgets  sustainably
would be reduced. The problems of Greece, Ireland
and  Portugal  would  not  be  resolved,  since  these
countries are unlikely to qualify for the ERP.
On  top  of  moral  hazard,  there  are  the  political
obstacles, which would be most acute in the case of
Eurobonds—the  "genuine  euro  area  safe  and  liquid
asset" proposed by the Interim Report on p. 6. For
instance,  Germany  demands  political  union  before
Eurobonds can be considered. But this is sometimes
said to put the cart before the horse: a political union
would  be  created  simply  to  justify  Eurobonds  [32].
Advocates from the Merkel government like Finance
Minister Wolfgang Schäuble say that  treaty changes
and high-level political agreements would be sufficient
to ensure that  euro area member countries  comply
with all  decisions taken at  the euro area level (see
again  his  recent  "Waehrungskommissar"  proposal).
But  the  experience  with  Greece's  adjustment  casts
severe doubt on such optimism. (Although recently,
after Angela Merkel came back from a visit to China,
surprisingly, some optimism towards the Greek case
re-emerged in German politics as reflected in concer-
ted media action in early autumn 2012).
Even a quick glance at the World Bank's databank
of  "governance  indicators"  shows  that  differences
between  Eurozone  members,  on  everything  from
respect for the rule of law to administrative capacity,
are so great that political union is unlikely to work, at
least in the next couple of years. It follows from the
perspective of the "North" that the case for Eurobonds
is extremely weak.
According to the "Northern" or "German" view, the
introduction of Eurobonds would have to, in principle,
be  backed  by  tight  oversight  of  national  fiscal  and
economic  policies.  This  is  correctly  reflected  in  the
Interim  Report  under  the  heading  "Integrated  eco-
nomic  policy  framework",  i.e.  Building  Block  3.  But
this view  neglects that there is no true enforcement
as long as the Eurozone members remain sovereign.
The  Interim  Report  argues  accordingly  that  in  this
case the pivotal role of national parliaments has to be
maintained  ([4],  p.  8,  President  of  the  European
Council).
Intervening  directly  in  the  fiscal  sovereignty  of
member  states  would  require  a  functioning  pan-
European democratic legitimacy, but we are far from
that (Building Block 4). Voters in Southern countries
can at any time reject the strong conditionality  de-
manded by Brussels,  while those of Northern coun-
tries  can refuse to  keep paying for  the  south.  And
either can choose to exit the Eurozone [32].
The emphasis on pushing through a fiscal union as
a  precondition  for  debt  mutualisation  means  the
debate, at least in Germany, has become a question
of "all or nothing":  either deeper political union (i.e.
Building Block 2) or deep chaos [5]. This unnecessar-
ily narrows the strategic options for the players and
causes the permanent "North-South" divide described
in this section (which is also mirrored in the Interim
Report), which is severely hampering the realization of
a "genuine" monetary and economic union.
But  this  paper  argues  that  there  is  in  fact  an
alternative option  to the notion of cooperative fiscal
federalism involving bailouts and debt mutualisation:
competition-based fiscal  federalism, of  the sort  suc-
cessfully operating in the US, Canada and Switzerland,
among others. These countries have largely avoided
serious and sustained public debt in their component
states. The sub-federal entities faced with insolvency
have a great incentive to take early corrective action—
without  having  to  force  the  member-states  into  a
corset  of  centralised  fiscal  policy  coordination.  This
view seems to be a good compromise between the
"Southern" and the "Northern" view.
To achieve this sort of federalism, it is necessary to
separate the fate of the banks from that of the sover-
eigns.  What is  needed is  not  a  fiscal  union in  first
instance,  but a banking union  (Building Block 1).  It
should be based on four elements: a reformed bank-
ing regulation with significantly higher equity capital
standards;  a  European  banking  oversight  with  far-
reaching  powers  to  intervene;  a  banking  resolution
fund; and a European deposit insurance scheme. This
has also been recognized and acknowledged by the
Merkel Government.
A  banking  union—a  less  comprehensive,  more
clearly delineated and rather technical task—should be
far better accepted in the "North" than the European-
isation of  fiscal  policy  as  a  whole.  This  is  precisely
because it touches upon only a small fraction of the
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fiscal policy areas which have to be subordinated to
central control in a fiscal union.
Obviously, a central resolution authority has to be
endowed with the resources to wind up large cross-
border banks. Where does the money for this come
from? In the long run, the existence of a resolution
authority goes along with a deposit insurance scheme
for cross-border banks. This should be—according to
the  "German"  view—funded  partly  by  the  banking
industry. But there should also be a backstop by the
euro area governments provided through the EFSF or
the ESM in order to cope with situations of systemic
bank failure [33].
As a temporary transition measure, however, lim-
ited debt mutualisation may then be necessary—but
only to recapitalise banks that cannot be sustained by
their sovereigns. However, the amounts required are
much smaller than for, say Eurobonds [33].
With the banking system and the debt crisis thus
disentangled,  banking-sector  losses  will  no  longer
threaten to destroy the solvency of solid sovereigns
such as Ireland and Spain. Eurobonds will then not be
needed, and neither will the bailout of sovereigns. The
debt  of  over-indebted  states  could  be restructured,
which  means  that  the  capital  market  could  exert
stronger discipline on borrowers [5].
3.2.3. Summary
There are at least two questions left which have not
yet been covered in this paper and will be answered
in the following sections. If the banking sector really is
to be stabilised,  a  solution will  surely  have  to deal
with  the  devalued  sovereign  debt  that  some  are
holding. Would the banks not be better off holding at
least  some  Eurobonds  instead  of,  say,  Greek  or
Spanish bonds? That said, "Southern" economists who
advocate  Eurobonds need to  find  a way of  making
them politically  acceptable.  And  how much  political
union is feasible, or even desirable, just for the sake
of a single currency that many never loved? (and also,
where does the burden end up?).
3.3. Rebuttal—Banking Union and Other Issues
3.3.1. The "Southern" View: Fiscal Debt Mutualisation 
to Protect Banks from Sovereign Failures
It is quite surprising to find the German government
on the "against  the debt mutualisation"  side in this
debate. In fact, for instance, de Grauwe [19] argues
that  a couple of German politicians develop an elo-
quent plea for mutualising the debt in the context of a
banking union [5]. As proponents of the "Southern"
view recognise,  the banking union that  the  "North"
defends (and that the "South" also defends) requires
"a backstop provided by the euro-zone governments".
This  is  nothing  but  an  implicit  joint  liability  of  the
Eurozone  governments  to  commit  future  taxpayers'
money to a systemic banking crisis.
A  second surprise  for  "Southern"  governments  is
that  Germany  is  not  be  willing  to  apply  all  the
objections it has levied against the issue of Eurobonds
to  his  proposal  for  an  implicit  Eurobond  issue  to
defend the banks.
The "Southern" policymakers emphasise that prom-
ising future support to banks (Building Block 1) surely
creates similar moral hazard risks as promising future
support to sovereigns. There is no reason to assume
that  the  latter  are  more  serious  than  the  former.
According to their view, they find it strange that pro-
ponents of the "Northern" view do not apply his stern
moral  hazard analysis to banks in the same way as
they do to the sovereigns. They seem to believe that
bankers are more trustworthy than sovereigns [19].
"Southern"  euro  area  governments  acknowledge
that there is a serious problem of democratic legitim-
acy  in  any  scheme  that  ties  the  hands  of  future
European taxpayers (Building Block 4). But they claim
that  the same problem arises if  such taxpayers are
called upon to save banks or sovereigns. In this vein,
de Grauwe [19] represents the "Southern" view and
argues that the "North" tries to extricate itself from
this difficult problem by stating that the bank-related
debt  mutualisation  it  proposes  will  have  only  small
consequences for future taxpayers [5]. What is more,
the total bank debt in the Eurozone is three times the
government  debt.  Potential  future  liabilities  are
certainly not small in his scheme, de Grauwe argues.
Finally,  there  is  the  "putting  the  cart  before  the
horse"  argument  often  heard  in  Germany:  that  we
have to wait for a political union before we can start
issuing Eurobonds. But why does that argument not
count  when,  in  the  absence  of  a  political  union,
Germany, for instance, proposes setting up a banking
union in which one of  the first  steps is  installing a
banking oversight mechanism? A banking union is not
just  a  technical  matter,  as  the  "North"  often  states
(see  Section  3.2.2).  The  "South"  claims  that  it
requires  the  same political  infrastructure  to  enforce
decisions  taken  at  the  European  level  and  to  give
taxing powers to the European institutions that will be
called upon to sustain the banking sector [19].
Proponents  of  the  "Southern"  view  permanently
emphasise that they do not want to be misunderstood
on this issue. They concede that  the problems that
their  "Northern"  counterparts  evoke  are  real  ones
[19].  However,  their  criticism  is  that  the  "North"
emphasises these problems when discussing one form
of  debt  mutualisation—the issue  of  Eurobonds—and
ignores them when proposing its  own form of debt
mutualisation [19]. It might also be worth mentioning
the German opposition to a third form of mutualisa-
tion, namely deposit insurance.
Moreover,  the  "South"  argues that  "problems are
there  to  be  solved".  The  moral  hazard  problem  is
acknowledged to be a difficult one, but the "South"
claims that  its  impact can be minimised. In Section
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3.2.1, some principles have already been formulated
to reduce this moral hazard risk.  One was that the
mutualisation should be partial; the other was that it
should be linked to transfers of sovereignty. These are
the  conditions  the  "North"  seems  to  stress  while
despairing that they can be met today [19].
The  "Southern"  Eurozone  governments  call  it  a
fundamental  problem  that—in  compliance  with  the
German view—the community of euro area member
states must  wait  for  a  political  union before  it  can
think of  mutualising the debt [19].  But how do we
start a political union? The "South" argues that "just
waiting will not make it happen". Hence, there is only
one other approach from the "Southern" perspective:
taking  small  steps  towards  political  union  [19].  At
some point the content of  political  union should be
explained—as is done in the Interim Report. The in-
teresting  point  from  the  perspective  taken  in  this
paper is that it could be seen as the fourth dimension
of the October 2012 report by the 'four presidents' i.e.
the legitimacy and accountability dimension (Building
Block 4).
The "South" concedes that "North" and "South" can
disagree  on  what  these  steps  should  be.  But  the
"North" tells it that the first and only step should be a
limited mutualisation of the debt so as to sustain a
banking  union.  The  "South"  is  in  favour  of  the
"North's"  banking  union  (Building  Block  1).  But  it
disagrees when the "North" claims that this is all that
is needed and that the capital markets will take care
of  the  rest  by  "exerting  stronger  discipline  on
borrowers" [31]—the efficient market theory is a deus
ex machina to save the euro.
Once we take the first step, we will be confronted
with the need to take other steps, the "South" further
argues. According to the "Southern" view, the banking
union  protects  the  sovereigns  from  bank  failures,
which  is  a  good thing.  But  it  does not  protect  the
banks from sovereign failures. These will continue to
occur  in  the  Eurozone  with  or  without  efficient
markets [19]. Thus by hitting the banks, a sovereign
debt crisis will force other Eurozone governments to
support the banks, and thus the sovereigns. Then, the
"South" argues, we will have come full circle. In order
to  support  the  banks,  sovereigns  will  be  forced  to
support each other.  One step, i.e.  Building Block 1,
necessarily leads to a second step, i.e., Building Block
2. The "South" is iteratively proposing that we may as
well  take  that  second step now (see  most  recently
French  President  Hollande  at  the  EU  Summit  in
Brussels on 18 October 2012).
3.3.2. The "Northern" View: No Debt Mutualisation as 
Long as "South-North" Divide Is Structural
As pointed out in Section 3.2.1, the "Southern" view
regrets  that  Eurozone  countries  do  not  have  the
control  over  the  European  Central  Bank  which
countries such as Britain and America have over their
central banks. But according to the "Northern" view,
that is not a flaw in the system. Instead, it was de-
signed that way in order that governments should not
be able to inflate their way out of trouble. In Britain
and  America  there  is—according  to  the  "Northern"
view a tango between the central bank (which cannot
become illiquid because of the possibility of inflating)
and  with  the  government  (which  cannot  become
insolvent,  given  the  possibility  of  imposing  and  in-
creasing taxes). De Grauwe [19] implicitly unveils the
"Southern"  view of  the role monetary policy  should
play in accompanying debt pooling when he says that
the main task of a central bank is to "give a guarantee
to bondholders that cash is  always available to pay
them  out…"  According  to  the  proponents  of  the
"Northern"  view,  he thus directly  complies  with the
wishes of the rating agencies and US-portfolio man-
agers  to orchestrate  sovereign bond purchases  and
bazookas in the form of long-term refinancing opera-
tions by the ECB.
As a starting point, the "North" points to the fact
that macroeconomic evidence is clearly not compat-
ible  with  the  "Southern"  view  that  those  "who  are
strong today may become weak tomorrow and vice
versa". In practice, the opposite has happened. This is
because  of  diverging  long-term  trends  between
Southern  and  Northern  Eurozone  countries  in  the
quality of governance, the rule of law, labour market
performance, growth and current account imbalances
(Building  Block  3).  These  differences  have  become
structural  and  long-lasting  in  the  case  of  several
Eurozone countries. Spain, for instance, has arguably
been suffering  from very  high  structural  unemploy-
ment for decades and will be additionally hampered in
the decades to come by its excessive investment in
construction [14].
The main problem debt pooling is supposed (by the
"North") to solve is that, given the 'sudden stop' in
cross  border  capital  flows,  some  Southern  member
states must close their current account deficits as they
have actually started to do in recent months. So, in
the short run, they need to reduce consumption, and
in  the  long  run,  they  need  a  shift  of  resources  to
exports  via  lower  wages  and  structural  reform
(Building Block 3). But debt pooling will not help them
make these adjustments (Building Block 2).
In the same vein, the "North" notes that the relat-
ively good performance of the Spanish economy in the
years 2010 to 2011 was due to the slowdown of the
adjustment in both the government accounts and the
housing sector.  This delay was thus the result  of  a
lack of leadership, and is not an argument for debt
pooling. Its long-term costs are now becoming appar-
ent.  The huge construction overhang implies  losses
that the banking sector may be facing once adjust-
ment is  complete (see the macro-prudential  policies
proposed in Building Block 3). It corresponds with the
amount of real resources wasted by expenditure that
was  financed  mostly  by  loans.  It  far  exceeds  the
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provisions and the write-downs as yet accumulated by
the Spanish banking system. If debt-pooling were in
place, Spain's banks might still be making those loans.
The  "South"  on  some  occasions  outlines  hard
budget constraints to accompany debt pooling [19].
Its  representatives  propose  binding  mechanisms  of
compensating  the  more  creditworthy  countries  and
controlling  the behaviour of  those that  are less  so.
But,  according to the "Northern" view, historical ex-
perience gives reason to doubt that this will work—for
several reasons.
One reason is that Spanish foreign debt is currently
the greatest risk to the Eurozone, and it is essentially
private. As long as the private sector has access to
the ECB system at interest rates that are below the
market  rate,  the  correction  of  external  imbalances
through real internal devaluations will not take place,
or if it does, at least not in sufficient quantities. The
"South's" approach would require not only public debt
limits  but  also  private  debt  barriers  to  bring  about
such  a  correction,  but  that  would  be  an  absurd
endeavour.
The "South"  should draw some lessons from the
current conduct of monetary policy. The latter already
uses debt pooling, of a sort. The quality of the collat-
eral  that  the  ECB  accepts  varies  considerably  from
country to country. In the case of the ECB's lending to
Greek  banks,  it  consists  of  doubtful  private  Greek
assets and Greek government debt whose value de-
pends on election results, as has been recently ob-
served. Thus the ECB acts as a central counterparty
for cross-border lending which incurs risks along na-
tional  lines  [34].  Risk  mutualisation  could  well,  if
things go wrong, turn into full debt mutualisation, and
lead to conflicts between member states. It provides
an advance warning of how debt pooling could lead to
the disintegration of the Eurozone.
This  is  precisely  why  the  Interim  Report  argues
with respect to its Building Block 2 that in the long run
"…(i)n the EMU, the response to a symmetric shock
affecting all countries simultaneously should primarily
be  provided  by  monetary  policy,  whereas  in  the
context of country-specific economic shocks, the re-
sponse falls primarily on national budgets" ([4], p. 5,
President of the European Council).
3.3.3. Summary
For "Northern" governments like the German one, the
mutualisation of debt is just another form of subsidy
and bail-out for which markets clamour, be it the overt
help  given to Greece,  or the more discreet liquidity
provided by the European Central Bank.
The  fact  that  there  is  a  loud  chorus  demanding
subsidies does not, in Germany's view, make it right
[5].  The Merkel  government  argues that  assistance
does not help countries make the necessary macroe-
conomic  adjustment  in  either  public  or  private
borrowing. Safeguards and conditions as stand-alone
measures will  not  work.  Anything that  puts  off  the
rebalancing of the current-account deficit only builds
up the forces for the disintegration of the Eurozone.
Watching the "South" borrow and spend themselves
into  bankruptcy  and  then  bailing  them out  is  both
immoral and irresponsible.
In  their  rebuttal,  "Southern"  governments  target
what they regard as the contradiction in the "North's"
position, rejecting debt mutualisation while supporting
a joint Eurozone backstop for the banking sector [19].
Are banks any more trustworthy than sovereigns?
The "South" usually argues, moreover, that mutual-
isation of banking liabilities will inevitably be followed
by the pooling of debt. Banking union on its own, for
instance  de  Grauwe  [19]  notes,  would  protect  the
sovereigns  from  banking  crises.  But  it  would  not
protect banks from sovereign-debt crises. If banking
union (Building Block 1) must be followed by the fiscal
sort (Building Block 2), it would be best to do it at the
same time, the "South" argues.
But  many questions  remain unanswered—the In-
terim Report is also no exception to this rule. Some
German politicians identify the tendency of the single
currency to push the economies of its members apart
[5].  If  all  countries  are  to  fend  for  themselves,  as
some proponents of the "German" view assert, would
they  not  be  better  off  restoring  their  own  national
currencies  so  that  macroeconomic  adjustment  can
take place more painlessly (a point directly related to
Building Block 3)? As a blogger in The Economist On-
line puts it, "The south will end up having to leave the
euro to save what's left of its economy" (see [35]).
For its part, the "South" indicates that more steps
will  have  to  be  taken  beyond  the  mutualisation  of
debt and banking liabilities, including the transfer of
sovereignty to Brussels [19]. But what is the limit of
all  this?  "This  is  not  an  economic  problem.  It  is  a
cultural  problem.  We  are  experiencing  mutinies  by
various groups among the passengers and deck and
engine room crews" (see [36]). If Southern govern-
ments  are  right  in  saying  that  the  banking  union
should be the first step towards the eventual creation
of the United States of Europe, when will the citizens
be asked to give their opinion of the whole project?
Clearly, Building Block 4 is addressed here.
3.4. Closing—The Way Forward
3.4.1. "South": A Monetary Union Cannot Last without 
Debt Mutualisation to Avoid Deflation
The  key  issue  is  this:  can  a  monetary  union  last
without some form of fiscal union? Economists have
been debating this issue for decades. It seems at least
to the "South" that the consensus among them is that
a monetary union without some form of fiscal union
will not last. This view is clearly shared by the Interim
Report.
What kind of fiscal union is necessary to sustain a
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monetary  union  (Building  Block  2)?  "Southern"
governments tend to argue that such a fiscal  union
must have two components. First, it must have some
insurance component, i.e. there must be some trans-
fer  mechanism from regions (countries)  that experi-
ence good economic times to regions (countries) that
experience bad times (the Interim Report alternatively
proposes  a  central  budget  with  similar  functions).
According to the "South", the US is often seen as a
successful monetary union, partly because the federal
government's budget performs the role of insurance.
"Southern" governments are also eager to point out
that the opponents will not cease to stress that such
an insurance mechanism creates moral hazard issues.
But that is the case with all  insurance mechanisms.
Representatives of the "Southern" view argue, as an
analogy,  that  one generally  also  does  not  conclude
that  people  should not  have fire  insurance because
such insurance creates moral hazard, i.e. it will lead to
more fires.
The second component of a fiscal  union is  some
degree  of  debt  pooling.  Economist  defending  the
"Southern"  view have argued that  this  is  necessary
because in becoming members of a monetary union
countries have to issue debt in a "foreign" currency
and therefore become more vulnerable to upsurges of
distrust and fear in financial markets. These can, in a
self-fulfilling way, push countries  into a bad equilib-
rium that makes it more difficult for them to adjust to
imbalances  [19].  Of  course,  debt  pooling  does  not
solve  these  fundamental  problems  (as  "Northern"
governments suggest that the "South" believes), but it
avoids  pushing  countries,  like  Spain  today,  into  a
deflationary spiral that causes their debt problems to
deteriorate, not improve.
Thus  monetary  union  and  fiscal  union  (including
some degree of debt mutualisation) are the opposite
sides of the same coin. As was made clear earlier in
this paper, the proponents of the "Northern" view like
to refer to history. The "Southern" economists also do
this. According to them, there are no successful mon-
etary unions that are not embedded in a fiscal union
that includes debt mutualisation.
Some economists,  especially  in  Northern  Europe,
continue  to  argue  that  one  can  have  a  monetary
union without a fiscal union. Paul de Grauwe [19], for
instance,  reduces the "Northern" view to something
like  "all  we  need  is  discipline  (a  fiscal  compact?),
including  a  credible  no-bail-out  clause.  If  we  allow
governments to default, financial markets will do their
work in disciplining these governments". According to
both  the "South"  and the Interim Report,  this  view
can certainly not be taken seriously any longer [19].
This is because financial markets are utterly incapable
of applying the right discipline to governments. When
markets  are  euphoric,  as  they  were during the ten
years before the crisis, they intensify indiscipline by
giving  incentives  to  borrowers  and  lenders  alike  to
create  excessive  debt  and  credit.  Since  the  crisis
erupted, financial markets have been in a continuous
state  of  fear  and  panic,  leading  them  to  apply
excessive discipline that  has led  nowhere except  to
increasing debt burdens [19].
When the dust in this debate has settled, it will—
according to the "Southern" view—be clear that the
greatest  obstacle  to  debt  mutualisation  and  the
continuing existence of the Eurozone is a lack of trust
—which has not yet been eliminated, as the Interim
Report clearly  proves.  "Northern European countries
distrust  southern  European  countries  and  have
propagated the myth that the North is morally super-
ior compared with the corrupt regimes in the South.
In Northern mythology, Southern European countries
are seen as utterly incapable of setting their house in
order.  Lending money to  these countries  is  pouring
the  hard-earned  money  of  virtuous  German  savers
into  a  bottomless  pit.  Southern  European  countries
distrust the North and have propagated the myth that
Northern  European  countries  are  out  to  dominate
them and to impose a harsh and inhumane regime on
helpless people. Mutual distrust is growing and is left
unchecked because in all these countries few people
stand up to call these myths just myths" [19].
The idea that a successful monetary union needs
two essential  ingredients  is  common to the "North"
and the "South". One is mutual support; the other is a
mutual control system. "Mutual support is essential to
create a sense of belonging, without which no union
can survive. In that sense a monetary union is like a
marriage" [19]. It cannot survive if the partners tell
each other that they should not count on help when
they are in trouble. Mutual control is also essential in
order to avoid opportunistic behaviour by those who
receive help [19].  Unfortunately,  the Interim Report
claims that this control should take place by way of
plans  and  newly  designed  mechanisms,  but  not
through markets.
Mutual support and control can only be organised
effectively  in  the  context  of  a  political  union,  the
"South" claims. That is the institutional environment in
which  support  and  control  can  acquire  democratic
legitimacy (Building Block 4) and become sustainable.
Thus,  the  choice  is  clear:  either  the euro area be-
comes a country,  or it  disappears.  There is  nothing
intermediate option. This view is also shared among
the "South" and the "North".
3.4.2. "North": Towards a Concept of Competition-
Based Fiscal Federalism in the Eurozone?
In Section 3.2.2, I set out the most important com-
ponents of a competition-based fiscal federalism that
would  probably  make  Eurobonds  (Building  Block  2)
unnecessary. These relate mainly to Building Block 1.
This  is  not  because  banking  union  is  equivalent  to
Eurobonds (as  claimed by  de Grauwe [19]  but  be-
cause it would disentangle a banking and a sovereign-
debt  crisis.  With  a  solid  banking  system  in  place,
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banking-sector  losses would no longer  threaten the
solvency  of  solid  sovereigns (such  as  Ireland  and
Spain),  and  the  bail-out  of  less  reliable  sovereigns
would  no  longer  be  necessary.  That  means  there
would be a lower chance that  fundamentally  sound
sovereigns would suffer from a confidence crisis and
rocketing risk premiums.
Proponents of the "Northern" view do not accept
the argument of the "South", coined for instance by
de Grauwe [19], that a banking union does not pro-
tect the banks from sovereign failures. In a banking
union, the capital  market could exert its  disciplining
influence  more  effectively  than  it  does  now.  Debt
restructuring for insolvent states would become more
probable.  The debtor  state would lose its  strongest
asset  (the  claim  that  default  would  cause  huge
damage to the entire financial system) and creditors
could not  rely  on taxpayers  to recoup their  money.
This,  in turn, would put governments with unsound
finances under pressure to curb their deficits.
Instead they hint at a wide array of econometric
studies showing a systematic relationship of sovereign
bond  yields  and  the  anticipated  sustainability  of  a
country's public  debt—at least in  the medium term.
They leave it to the Banca d'Italia's research depart-
ment to come up with convertibility risk (measured by
google-nomics counting google searches for euro area
breakup), as an explanatory variable of Southern sov-
ereign bond yield spreads over the German yield [37].
Only recently, the spread on Spanish bonds moved up
after Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish prime minister, an-
nounced  that  he  intended  to  relax  Spain's  deficit-
adjustment path; as when Italy decelerated its pace
of reforms. Hence, proponents of the "Northern" view
can  sleep  quite  well  with  the  idea  that  "capital
markets will take care of the rest".
To eliminate the fragility from the banking system,
we must  establish a temporary,  or even permanent
European  Resolution  Authority  (ERA),  whose  task
would be to rehabilitate fragile banks across Europe,
regardless of size. Weaker banks would receive a one-
time injection of capital or be wound down, wholly or
partly. This body should have the power to turn bank
debt into equity capital. Creditors of ailing banks—but
not  the  taxpayers,  as  de  Grauwe  [19]  assumes—
should,  as  far  as possible,  be made liable  for  their
risky investments. In contrast with Eurobonds, which
tend  to  cover  many  bad  risks,  a  European  deposit
scheme based on funding from the banks themselves
(in order to avoid taxpayers bearing the risk) would in
the end embrace only stronger banks [33].
The "North" admits to the "South" that it is right to
argue that the lack of a budgetary union, akin to the
American system, is a design failure of the Eurozone.
Proponents of the "Northern" view also strongly sup-
port  the "South's"  view that a proper application of
the American system would prevent a costly disinteg-
ration—but most probably for different reasons. Since
the US system prevents central-bank loans from being
more  attractive  than  market  loans,  it  avoids
permanent  balance-of-payment  imbalances  between
member  states.  In  America,  neither  the  individual
state nor the private sector has access to the printing
press  to  finance  itself  and  can  default.  If  the
inhabitants of a state need to finance their  current-
account deficits, they have to offer attractive interest
rates  and  provide  sufficient  collateral  to  private
lenders from other American states [5].
Yet the "South" argues, essentially, that Eurozone
countries'  main  problem  is  that  they  do  not  have
direct access to the printing press [19]. According to
the  "North",  and,  thus,  following  the  strange
behaviour of rating agencies, which penalise members
of the Eurozone simply for being part  of  the single
currency.  For  too long the  agencies  rated  countries
too generously,  pricing in a potential  bail-out rather
than  basing  ratings  purely  on  macroeconomic
fundamentals.  This  pattern  made  risk-free  profits
possible from risk-free speculation against sometimes
hopelessly  non-competitive  member  states.  The
"South" reinterprets this as a question of  "panicked
financial markets" in its mother of all arguments for
debt pooling [19].
Especially  according  to  the  "Northern"  view,  the
members of the Eurozone are intentionally kept away
from the ECB to avoid them activating the inflation tax
to  finance  themselves.  The  scope  for  an  individual
country  to  incur  government  debt  is  simply  lower
within  a  currency  union  than  outside.  This  scope
cannot  be  extended  through  debt  pooling  without
risking the disintegration of the Eurozone [5].
But the "Northern" view contains a lot more. As a
rule,  the burden on bank balance sheets should be
borne by the country of domicile and not—as in the
case of Eurobonds—be passed on to other countries
(Building Block 2).  However,  it  is  not clear whether
and  to  what  extent  over-indebted  countries  will  be
capable of doing this. Using the rescue funds would
make  sense  as  a  fiscal  backstop.  Subject  to
negotiation, a temporary debt mutualisation to cover
the cost of bank recapitalisation would make sense, to
avoid  a  larger  and  permanent  mutualisation  of
sovereign debt. But only after a proper pan-European
banking oversight has been finalised and implemented
(Building Block 1 and [5]).
3.4.3. Summary
Throughout  the  Eurozone's  debt  crisis,  many
Europeans have looked across the Atlantic for lessons
on  how  to  run  a  successful  monetary  union.  The
European Commission boasts that, taken together, the
Eurozone's  fiscal  deficit  and  debt  are  lower  than
America's. Yet the euro faces an existential crisis while
the  dollar,  despite  the  troubles  of  the  American
economy, still remains a shelter.
So, how much banking and fiscal integration does
the Eurozone need to restore stability (Building Blocks
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1 and 2)? And how much political unity does it need
to  maintain  checks  and  balances,  and  democratic
legitimacy  (Building  Block  4)?  Looking  at  the  US,
"Southern" and "Northern" economists and politicians
more  or  less  agree  on  the  need  for  some kind  of
federalised system to recapitalise, restructure or wind
down ailing banks. That is where the "North" thinks
integration  should  stop—in  contrast  to  the  Interim
Report. The key lesson from the US is, in its view, that
it pays to enhance market discipline on the states: as
long as the banking system is stabilised at minimal
cost  to  the  taxpayer,  over-indebted  states  can  be
allowed to go bust.
But  proponents  of  the  "South"  (as  well  as  the
drafters of the Interim Report) think that  this deals
with  only  half  of  the  vicious  circle  between  weak
banks  and  weak  sovereigns,  and  therefore  cannot
work in the long run. In his view, what makes America
and other monetary unions stable is a system of joint
bonds and other forms of mutual insurance and in-
ternal transfers to redress economic imbalances [19].
Drawing a parallel with the US case inevitably leads
one to consider the obvious difference: the US is a
federal country; the Eurozone however is a collection
of  17  separate  states.  De  Grauwe  [19]  vividly  ad-
dresses this point, which is an essential ingredient of
the  "Southern"  view,  directly  in  his  final  sentence:
"The choice is clear: either the euro zone becomes a
country,  or  it  disappears.  There  is  nothing  in
between." Section 3.4.2 does not speak much about
the  desirability  of  political  union,  but  the  "North's"
vision implies that the Eurozone should remain a col-
lection of sovereign countries, each guarding its tax-
payers' interests by limiting their exposure to others.
Many  in  the  active  and  engaged  audience  of
European  citizens  reflect  on  the  loss  of  national
sovereignty and discretion that may be necessary to
make  the  single  currency  work.  From the  floor  we
hear bloggers state: "the only way this could work is if
all the countries agree on a common retirement age,
welfare, unemployment, etc.", "Mutualisation of debt
has to be tied to a real surrender of fiscal sovereignty.
The reason is  obvious:  Only a complete fool  would
share his unlimited credit card with someone if he had
no control over their spending", and "As long as there
is no European army to force European countries to
comply with directives (on budgets and spending) of a
central authority, it will always be a game of bluff and
brinkmanship." (see [38]).
4. Conclusions
We can only hope that most of the panic selling of the
'Southern'  sovereign bonds has  already taken  place
and that the crisis is now slowly easing by itself, now
that the 'Southern' countries have gone through the
necessary adjustment recession. We should note that,
currently,  only  financial  institutions  that  are able  to
bear some risk still hold these bonds. This is rational
since  optimally  a  (risk-weighted)  portfolio  of  (all
available) sovereign bonds is held, a behaviour which
is often intended to be mimicked by Eurobonds. For
just  this  reason,  these  holders  will  not  suddenly
release the entirely of their bonds to the market, even
if difficulties emerge. The current account imbalances
will then recede, and the public sector will strengthen.
But,  admittedly,  a  perfect  'genuine'  Economic  and
Monetary Union seems impossible in the future, too,
due to country-specific interests along a 'North-South'
divide [19]. It could, however, be more stable than at
present,  with  a  strong  banking  union  that  also
enforces the fully  justified Maastricht  vision of  hard
budget  constraints  [14,32].  A  European  Monetary
Fund would certainly be another important component
of a more stable currency zone [39-41].
This  article has identified  two principal,  but com-
peting,  ways to stabilize the Eurozone. With  central-
ized  control  over  fiscal  policy  and  also  over  some
economic  policy  areas  one  could  introduce  a  joint
liability for government debt  to exclude bankruptcies
of individual states. In this note we were not able to
identify  any  current  willingness  and/or  democratic
legitimacy to proceed in this manner in the short to
medium run. Alternatively, one may thus feel forced to
leave the decision-making power over public debt to
national parliaments. But then it must be possible as a
conditio sine qua non that countries become insolv-
ent, and private creditors are held fully responsible—a
clear  complement  to  a  European  Monetary  Fund
[39,41]. However, this is only possible if the financial
sector is changed in such a way that government in-
solvency no longer affects the stability of the banking
system. This could be achieved by a  banking union.
The fundamental problem to be resolved consists of
the skeletons that have remained in the cupboards of
some countries' banking systems, and which must not
be passed on to the community [5].
The emphasis on pushing through a fiscal union as
a  precondition  for  debt  mutualisation  means  the
debate, at least in Germany, has become a question
of 'all  or nothing':  either deeper political union (i.e.
Building Block 2) or deep chaos.  This unnecessarily
narrows  the  strategic  options  for  the  players  and
causes the permanent 'North-South' divide described
by Belke [5]—which is  also mirrored in the Interim
Report—severely hampering the realisation of a 'genu-
ine' monetary and economic union.
However,  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  has
bought  only  some  time  with  its  Securities  Markets
Programme  (SMP),  Longer-Term  Refinancing  Opera-
tions  (LTROs)  and  Outright  Market  Transactions
(OMTs) and it is vital that the fundamental problems
are addressed through a concept of a 'genuine' Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union. A major problem is that
many losses are passed on the ECB and redistribution
policy is  carried out primarily by monetary policy. It
would be better if fiscal authorities restructured banks
in a targeted fashion. In the medium run, a way must
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be found to protect the ECB and to guarantee a truly
financially and politically independent monetary policy.
The Interim Report correctly stresses in this respect 'a
clear  separation  between  ECB  monetary  policy  and
supervisory functions' [4].
The "South" is right in stating that the lack of a
budgetary union like that in the US is a design failure.
This  paper  also  strongly  supports  the  view  that  a
proper application of the US system would prevent a
costly  disintegration  process  of  the  Eurozone—but
maybe for different reasons. In order to assess the
"Southern" euro area governments' proposals of debt
pooling and compare them with the US benchmark it
is  necessary to look at  the main ingredients of  the
rules  of  the  game of  the  US federal  system which
became clear only after nine defaults by the 1840s.
Since the US system (unlike the current situation in
the Eurozone) prevents central bank loans from being
more attractive than market loans, it avoids perman-
ent balance-of-payment imbalances between member
states and, in this way, current account deficits which
fail  to  be  backed  by  credible  and  solid  investment
projects.  In  the  US,  neither  the  individual,  federal
state nor the private sector has access to the printing
press to finance itself. If the inhabitants of a federal
state  require  financing  for  their  current  account
deficits, they must offer other states attractive interest
rates  and  provide  sufficient  collateral  to  private
outside lenders. If they fail, they simply dispense with
borrowing  and  current  account  imbalances  do  not
spread in the first place.
This  contribution  is  in  strong  accordance  with
"Southern  view"  that  the  instalment  of  a  US-type
budgetary union remains illusionary. The best proof of
this  is  the  over-indebted  euro  area  governments
crowding, sometimes massively, to reach a substantial
increase in the guarantees for excessive national debt
contained in the ESM, typically in advance and without
conditionality, and more or less hidden through offer-
ing the South's "right types" of debt pooling. Experi-
ence shows that the latter must suffer from the non-
credibility of all variants of rules proposed to prevent
moral  hazard—which  is  simply  due  to  a  lack  of
availability  of  forfeit  in  terms  of  gold,  foreign  ex-
change reserves or other hard assets involved and to
de-activating the interest rate mechanism (by fixing
upper bounds for "tolerable" rate movements) which,
however, is a central ingredient of the US-system.
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